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Keynote Speech by John C. Bogle, Senior
Chairman and Founder, The Vanguard Group
Money Matters Conference, The Boston Globe
Boston, Massachusetts
October 16, 1999
Good morning.
It's especially wonderful to be in the fair city of Boston, from
whence came, almost exactly 50 years ago, my inspiration to enter
the mutual fund industry. In December 1949, I read an article in
Fortune magazine entitled "Big Money in Boston," introducing
me to this industry for the first time. Thus inspired, I wrote my
senior thesis at Princeton University on "The Economic Role of the
Investment Company," joined the industry when I graduated in 1951,
and have been around ever since. It was also in Boston in early
1974 that I got fired from the company I'd joined at the outset
of my career, which led to my founding of Vanguard in September
1974, just 25 years ago. I've had an exciting career.
Over the years, I've often cited Von Clausewitz' epigram, "the greatest
enemy of a good plan is the dream of a perfect plan."
This morning I'm going to use that profound thought as the theme
of my keynote speech to you investors who are here today. My theme
will echo the fact, not only that "Money Matters," but that your
money matters. We are all trying to make sense out of our volatile
financial markets, our U.S. economy that is each day becoming more
a part of the global village, and the implications of our present
revolutionand it is no less than thatin information
technology and communications. In these wild days in the markets,
deciding on an intelligent investment plan must seem both complex
and confusing. What, you must wonder, is the best way to allocate
your assets among stocks and bonds and cash, and even other kinds
of assets? Once you make those decisions, how do you implement your
plan? What role should mutual funds play? Which funds should you
select from among the 7,500 that exist today? These are all tough
decisions, especially since the world of investing may well be at
a sort of inflection point today, and it is never easy to see around
the corner.
In this conference, you'll be exposed to a lot of commonsense ideas
for dealing with these complexities and uncertainties, and I urge
you to consider them with care. I imagine you'll also hear many
ideas that don't comport with at least my concept of common sense,
and I urge you to disregard each one of them in direct proportion
to its complexity, its decibel level, and the conviction of its
advocates that a favorable outcome is assured. Avoid complex strategies
that seem to provide temptingly easy solutions to eternally complex
problems. I warn you that complexitywhich I call "witchcraft"may
seem to offer a perfect plan, but it rarely delivers on the dream
it promises. What is more, complexity is expensive. The simplicity
of a good plan, on the other hand, can work not only effectively,
but economically. The good plan works, not despite being
inexpensive, but because it is inexpensive.
Asset
Allocation
My remarks today will focus on equity
mutual funds, but I want to begin with a brief word about asset
allocation, for it is one of the most important investment decisions
you make. While there are complex systems that offer precise formulas
for implementing the perfect asset allocation plan, the good asset
allocation plan simply assumes that these nuances of investing are
unpredictable. The good plan relies primarily on a straightforward
and conventional balance between stocks and bonds. How much in each
category? As ever, your investment balance must depend largely on
your own needs and circumstances. Typically, the allocation might
range from something as crude as, say, 50% in stocks and 50% in
bonds for older, moderately risk-averse investors who have accumulated
substantial capital, have reached normal retirement age, and need
to draw down income. Or up to 100% stocks for young, confident investors
who are just beginning to accumulate their first investments in
a 401(k) retirement plan and have scores of years before drawing
down income. In an uncertain worldand it will be ever thusgetting
your allocation almost right may be better than getting it
precisely wrong.
The fact is that we know little about the future returns that stocks
and bonds will provide. But we must rely primarily on stocks for
capital appreciation and on bonds for income, and we have to realize
that stocks involve substantial risks. No matter what you read about
the historical returns of common stocks, I assure you that the stock
market is not an actuarial table. But, the common stock portion
of your allocation provides the only sensible approach to building
your capital over the long term. So the question becomes: Which
equity mutual funds will build your capital with the greatest effectiveness?
Investing
the Stock Allocation
The perfect plan would be to identify
one or more mutual funds that may provide a return significantly
greater than that of the stock market. And the lesson of history
shows us that some mutual funds have in fact outpaced the
market. But that lesson also shows us that the odds against doing
so are long. In fact, even among those 145 equity mutual funds that
have in fact survived the past three decades, only 15 have
outpaced the stock market as a whole. That is, the fund investor
had only about one chance out of ten to surpass the market's return.
By how much? An interesting question. Only eight funds outpaced
the market by more than one percentage point per year. Thus, when
we eliminate the likely statistical noise involved in a margin of
plus or minus one percentage point to the market, the odds of success
now drop to just one chance out of 18. And the chances of picking
a loser are far higher. A total of 108 funds fell one percentage
point or more behind the market, 13 losers for each winner. And
fully 37 fundsone of every fourfell short of the market
by more than three percentage points per year, surely a deep disappointment
to their owners. Clearly, the odds against implementing a perfect
plan by selecting winning funds are long and the penalties for failure
disproportionately large.

Source: Lipper
Inc.
Why was it so difficult for these mutual
funds to merely match the return of the stock market? To answer that
question, I need only point out that, in all respects save one, the
stock market is a gambling casino. In the casino with which we are
familiar, gambling is a zero-sum game. One gambler's loss is another's
gainuntil the croupiers rake off their share of the wagers.
It is true at the roulette tables and at the racetrack alike. And
after the croupiers' rakes descend, the casino is a negative-sum game.
The longer the investor stays in the gambling casino, the greater
the certainty that he will, finally, be wiped out.
What is different in the stock market casino? Investing in equities
is not a zero-sum game, but a positive-sum game. Or at least it has
been during most of past history. With the profitability and growth
of corporate America, stock prices have risen steadily over the years.
Yet, each day, investment professionals and amateurs alike are buying
and selling stocks with one another, and when the seller wins, the
buyer loses and vice versa. So, in the stock market, the returns earned
by all investors are inevitably average and beating
the market is a zero-sum game. But, just as in the regular
casino, it is only a zero-sum game until the croupiers rake off their
shares. Then, investors as a group must, and do, fall short of the
market's return.
There are lots of croupiers in the stock market casino. Fund managers
receive substantial fees, and funds incur operating expenses; stock
brokers receive sales commissions when investors purchase fund shares
through them; investment bankers and brokers receive fees and commissions
for executing fund portfolio transactions. Even the federal government
finds itself among the croupiers, for portfolio turnover generates
realized capital gains and, therefore, taxes. Given all of these subtractions
from the market's return, the good plan relies on this surprising,
if obvious, rule for measuring investment success. The
central task of investing is to realize the highest possible portion
of the return earned in the financial asset class in which you investrecognizing,
and accepting, that that portion will be less than 100%.
It is simply a mathematical impossibilitya
definitional contradictionfor all investors as
a group to reach 100% of the stock market's returns.
Indeed, given the excessive costs of equity mutual funds, it is
a mathematical certainty that,
over a lifetime of investing, only a relative handful of investors
will succeed in doing so by any significant margin, just as we have
seen. If this is iconoclasm, so be it. But accepting this realitythat
investors as a group will inevitably capture less than 100% of the
stock market's rate of returnis the first step toward a good
plan for equity investing.
There is an obviousand optimalway to closely approach
this 100% target: Simply own the market.
It is easy. An all-stock-market index fund, in substance, owns shares
in every publicly held business in America, and holds it for as
long as the business exists. By slashing the croupiers' take, such
ownership is available at extremely low cost. There is no advisory
fee, for there is no adviser; no sales charges, for there need be
no broker; nominal fund transaction costs, for there is almost no
portfolio turnover; with so little turnover, few realized gains
and minimal taxes. It is fair to say that the all-market index fund
is the croupier's worst nightmare. And, therefore, the investor's
sweetest dream. The simplest of
all approaches to equity investors, then, is to invest solely in
the shares of a single, all-market equity index fundjust
one fund. It is a good plan. And it works.
But, I'm a realist. I recognize that in the real world, lots of
all-too-human traits get in the way of a simple, all-encompassing
index fund approach. "I'm too smart for that," you may think. "Even
if the game is expensive, it's fun." "It can't be that simple."
These are the all-too-common refrains in the minds of investorsam
I speaking for you?who choose to pursue the conventional
strategy of relying entirely on actively managed funds to implement
their investment strategies. "Hope springs eternal," as Alexander
Pope reminded us. But his full couplet reads: "Hope springs eternal
in the human breast; Man never is,
but always to be blest." Just as
the dream of the perfect plan has little chance of coming true,
so the anticipation of being blessed, Pope tells us, inevitably
falls short of realization.
It occurs to me that the main factor that causes investors to ignore
the good plan of indexing is not just that it is boringthe
market return is only, well, the market returnbut that the
index strategy seems dumb. In a sense, of course, it is. Perhaps
it is also deaf and blind. But, as it turns out, the dumb strategy
leads to a smart, even brilliant, decision. Hear Warren Buffett
on this subject:
By periodically
investing in an index fund
the know-nothing investor can
actually outperform most investment professionals. Paradoxically,
when 'dumb' money acknowledges its limitations, it ceases to be
dumb.
But if the index fund strategy is a good planmaybe even the
best plan available to most of us mere mortalsit need not
be the end. While the odds against picking a superior mutual fund
have been powerful, they have not been insurmountable. In a given
decade, perhaps one fund in five has beaten the market (before taxes).
And there are some simple commonsense principles that should help
you to select funds that can earn a generous portion of the market's
return, although they, too, are all too likely to fall short of
100%. If there are long odds against outpacing the market, at least
going about the task of fund selection intelligently can help you
to insure against a significant failure. So let me give you nine
rules that may help you to do just that.
Rule
1. Select Funds With Low Expense Ratios
I've said "costs matter" for so long
that the portfolio manager for one of our funds gave me a Plexiglas
pillar with the Latin translation: Pretium Refert. But costs do
matter, and their impact will likely grow in importance in the years
ahead. It is costs, pure and simple, that have accounted forand
will continue to account forthe lion's share of the shortfall
of the typical mutual funds in the stock market. The industry's
estimated 2.5% annual cost, for example, would consume fully 14%
of a market return of 17.5%, leaving 86% for you. That portion will
rise when returns revert to lower levels. That same cost would consume
25% of a market return of 10%. And if the going got really tough,
say, in a 5% market, fund costs of 2.5% would confiscate fully 50%
of the market return, leaving only 50% for the investor.

Source:
Vanguard Research (estimates).
As these costs are raked from the table
of the market casino, the croupiers with the largest rakes are the
fund managers. The fees and expenses you pay to them are rising
even faster than the industry's soaring asset base. Since 1980,
the expense ratio of the average equity fund has risen from 0.96%
to 1.52%a 58% increase. But, yes, larger fund groups have
lower costs. For example, in the fair city of Boston, the expense
ratios of the three largest fund managerstogether managing
a cool $1 trillion of fund assetsaverage 1.08%. But despite
the awesome growth of these firms, that figure is far higher than
their 0.64% average expense ratio in 1980, a leap of nearly 70%
that is even larger than the 58% increase for the industry as a
whole. "Big Money in Boston" all over again, 50 years later! It
is high time that this industry does something to reverse this steady
uptrend. And it's not impossible. During that same 20-year span,
one large fund firm has in fact gradually, but substantially, reduced
the costs paid by its investors. There ought to be a lot more firms
doing precisely that. You owe it to yourself to select from among
funds where the manager-croupiers exercise at least some restraint,
evidenced by expense ratios that are well below industry norms.

Source:
Lipper Inc.
Rule 2. Emphasize Funds
With Low Portfolio Turnover
Once
your money is invested in a fund, the rake of the next croupier
begins to sweep. Most funds continue to buy and then sell securities
unremittingly, and then sell them and buy them over and over again.
Believe it or not, fund portfolio turnover has risen to an all-time
high of 112% this year, meaning that the average fund held onto
a stock for just 326 days. That holding period is far more akin
to short-term speculation than to long-term investing,
which, not so many years ago, is what this industry was all about.
The rake wielded by the brokers, investment bankers, and institutional
traders is also a wide one. To pay for this staggering transaction
activity, turnover typically rakes off 0.5% to 1.0% of fund assets
each year. Consider a $1 billion stock fund with 112% turnover:
It sells $1.12 billion of stocks in a year, and reinvests the $1.12
billion proceeds in other stocks, total transactions of $2.24 billion,
even higher if the fund draws cash inflow from investors.
This high turnover is in part the product of
trading by hyperactive portfolio managers, anxious to garner a performance
edge on their peers, however fruitless the quest. But there is also
turnover among the managers themselves. All too often when a manager
departs, the new manager's broom sweeps clean, as he reorders the
portfolio to comport with his own strategies. Believe it or not,
the average mutual fund manager lasts just five years. For one giant
firm, the average tenure is but 2.5 years, as the croupiers come
and go. So, be aware, not only of a fund's turnover rate (it's shown
in the prospectus), but also both its management company's propensity
to move managers around, sometimes seemingly at the drop of a hat.
Turnover costs can cut your long-term returns by a meaningful amount,
so do your best to find funds both with portfolio holdings and
portfolio managers that will stay the course.
Rule 3. Realize That
Taxes Are Fund Costs Too
There is yet a third croupier in the fund
casino. And in this bull market era, it happens to be the greediest
croupier of them all: the federal government. Make no mistake about
it, Uncle Sam loves the mutual fund industry. For as impatient,
aggressive fund managers buy and sell stocks at a furious rate,
they pay virtually no attention whatsoever to the taxes such activity
will require you to pay. They can ignore taxes, but you
can't.
There is awesome value in deferring taxesand deferring them
for as long as you can. When you pay taxes today, that money can't
compound to your benefit tomorrow. Deferring a capital gain for
15 years reduces the present value of each one dollar of taxes to
just 41 cents; in 25 years, to 23 cents. Yet fund managers not only
require you to pay the 20% tax far too early, realizing long-term
capital gains far too prematurely. They also have been realizing
some one-third of all capital gains on a short-term basis,
thus forcing you to pay taxes at rates up to the 40% maximum on
dividend income. Many state taxesand Massachusetts, I need
not remind you, is hardly the most tax-friendly stateconsume
even more of these unnecessary fund gains. So look for tax-efficient
fundsnot only those that have been so in the past, but those
that have policies that emphasize ongoing tax-efficiency.
Rule 4. Be Careful About What You Pay for
Fund Selection Advice
Many investors need sensible advice in fund
selection and asset allocationand many do not. If you are
convinced you do not need advice, it is unwise to pay for it, either
in the form of front-end sales commissions (about 5% of the amount
invested), or 12b-1 sales fees included in a fund's expense ratio
(up to 1% of assets), or fees paid to registered investment advisers
and financial planners, usually beginning at about 1% of assets
and paid directly by the investor.
I have no hesitancy in saying that some of these providers of fund
selection advice can be characterized as croupiers. How else to
describe firms which are collectively spending up to $500 million
annually of their shareholder's hard-earned money on the advertising
campaigns you see incessantly on television, in the press, even
on billboards. Remember this: Those are your dollars the managers
are spending to bring in new investors, and there is simply no way
under the sun that they can bring any benefit whatsoever to you.
Consider whether you want to contribute to this cost: If not, tell
them about it.
I also have no hesitancy in saying that there are many investment
advisers and brokerage executives for whom the term "croupier" is
in no way appropriate. Indeed, the best advisers are exactly the
opposite: They can help you minimize the costs of the croupiers
in the stock market casino by steering you toward funds with low
expenses, low turnover, and high tax-efficiency. Equally important,
they can also help you to minimize the many pitfalls of fund selection,
provide you with sound asset allocation guidance, and give you personal
attention. If you are among the many investors who need this sort
of advice, get it. But be sure to carefully select your adviser
and know exactly the fees involved.
Rule 5. Add Up the Costs and Values in
the Market Casino
You owe it to yourself to consider the sum
total of the costs of the market casino, in the light of the financial
values you seek there. During the past 15 years, the diminution
in returns has been staggeringand unnecessary, almost entirely
the result of the take of the croupiers. The average pretax return
of the total U.S. stock market was 16.4% per year. But after the
costs of all of the croupiersfund sellers, fund managers,
stock brokers, and the federal governmentthe return for the
average fund investor was just 10.3% per year. By way of contrast,
a low-cost, no-load, low-turnover all-market index fund would have
provided an annual rate of return of 15.2% to the investornearly
50% higher.
And as both returns and costs compound, the difference widens. The
value of an initial $10,000 investment at the end of the period:
managed equity fund, $43,500; index fund, $83,500. In short, in
search of the perfect plan, the investor in the equity fund relinquished
55% of the market's gain to the croupiers, with but 45% left for
himself. On the other hand, by holding the croupiers' share to 14%
of the market's cumulative return, the investor who relied on the
good plan of a market index fund retained 86%. His $73,000 profit
was more than double the $33,000 profit of the regular investor.

Source: Vanguard
Research (estimates).
The point of this chart is not
to attempt to persuade you to abandon the active management strategy
that you likely follow, much as I might wish to do that. Rather, the
point is to show you the crucial importance of minimizing the take
of all of those croupiers out there. You must
do so if your long-term accumulation of assets is to meet your financial
requirements. Put another way, as you dream of developing the perfect
plan for investing, learn all that you can from the good
plan.
Rule 6. Beware of Past
Performance to Predict Future Performance
For your dream of a perfect plan to
be realized, you must select superior mutual funds. To an amazing
extent, investors rely on past performance to make their selections.
If you do so, I warn you, you are leaning on a weak reed. There is
simply no way of predicting a fund's future success based on its past
track record. Indeed, the one thing that appears certain about the
future relative performance of successful funds is this: Performance
superiority will not be sustained. For example, the top
quartile of 40 funds beat the market by nearly three percentage points
annually during the 1980s, only to lose by more than one percentage
point during the 1990sa reversion of 4.2 percentage points.
And of these 40 top-quartile funds during the 1980s, fully 39 funds
had their margins over the market reduced in the 1990s, including
30 funds that provided returns below those of the market.

|
|
1980s
|
1990s
|
|
Number of
funds
|
40 |
40 |
|
Number with
a reduced margin
|
|
39 |
|
Number with
an increased margin
|
|
1 |
|
Number lagging
the market
|
0 |
30 |
|
Number beating
the market
|
40 |
10 |
Source:
Lipper Inc.
This pattern is called "Reversion to the
Mean," a sort of law of gravity that seems to be almost universally
applicable in the financial markets. It is not
a statistical aberration. The reversion to the mean among the top-quartile
funds during the 1970s, for example, was 4.8% during the 1980s,
virtually identical to the reversion of 4.2% for the top-quartile
funds in the 1980s to the 1990s. Reversion to the mean, then, seems
almost preordained in fund performance, frustrating the dreams of
so many investors who invest on the basis of past returns. Finally,
index funds alone have relative predictability. They provide precisely
the market's return, less their costs, decade after decade after decade.
Rule 7. Rely on Past Performance
to Measure Consistency and Risk
While the dream of the perfect investment
plan will rarely be fully realized, there are
ways to avoid having it become a living nightmare. If past fund performance
cannot foretell the future, it can still be an important consideration
in selecting funds that have a fighting chance to earn consistent
returns relative to peer funds with similar styles and objectives.
Compare, for example, a large-cap blend (growth and
value) fund with other large-cap blend funds, and see how it stands
each year.
Morningstar, Inc. provides considerable help in this important endeavor,
showing whether a fund is in the first, second, third, or fourth quartile
in each of the past 12 years. The chart gives a fair reflection of
the fund's relative success. For a fund to earn a top-performance
rating means, in my mind, at least six to nine years in the top two
quartiles and no more than one or two in the bottom quartile. This
informationshown in this example of two real-world funds that
reflect the standards I've set forthis ignored by too many
investors.
The "good" fund is in the top half in seven years, in the bottom quartile
but once. The "bad" fund is in the top half five times, but in the
bottom quartile, four. Interestingly, for the full period, both funds
had similar annual returns of 17.5%, and both ranked among the top
one-third of their peers. But it is consistency
of return, not aggregate return,
that tells the important story to the intelligent investor.

*Quartile within
category.
Source: Morningstar, Inc.
So, careful analysis of past performance
can tell us a lot about return. But it can also tell us a lot about
risk. Risk is a crucial element in investing.
One good indicator is the Morningstar
risk rating. It provides a rough guide to how much risk the fund typically
assumes relative to its objective group and relative to all equity
funds. There are marked differences from one style to another, reflected
in the finding that, generally speaking, value funds carry distinctly
less risk than growth funds, and large-cap funds carry less risk than
small-cap funds. For example, small-cap growth funds carry 65% higher
risk than large-cap value funds. This chart presents the broad risk
profiles:

Source: Morningstar,
Inc.
I should note that while, over time, relative
fund returns vary randomly from one
period to the next, relative fund risks
carry a healthy degree of consistency. So, especially in these volatile,
care-laden days, ignore risk at your peril.
And while you're looking at that plethora of numbers,
please don't forget there is more to fund selection than numbers.
To me, the character, integrity, stability, and judgment of a fund's
management are the qualities on which your dream of the perfect plan
should rely. In all of your searching for the quantities
that describe investment returns, I urge you not to ignore the qualities
of those who will be the stewards of your precious assets.
Rule 8. Consider the Implications
of Asset Size
Any investor seeking the perfect plan
must be aware of asset size and its implications for the future returns
of the funds selected. By far, the biggest problem is that investors
seeking extraordinary future returns focus on extraordinary past returns,
frequently accomplished when a fund was small. Such returns are simply
not repeatable; indeed they may not even be honest. Only a few weeks
ago, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission censured
and fined one fund manager for reporting misleading returns, warning
that, "It is wrong to raise shareholder
expectations of future gains by advertising future returns when it
is highly unlikely those returns can be sustained." Yet on our television
sets and in our newspapers, every day, we see fund managers hawking
past fund records that cannot possibly
be sustained. Don't let yourself be influenced by such advertising.
Size, as such, is not necessarily bad. A giant
market index fund, indeed, may have inherent advantages over a very
small one. And the past record of a fund investing in large-cap stocks
on a long-term basis is likely relevant even if the fund has grown
to a multibillion dollar asset base. But giant size limits the investment
universe from which a manager must select the fund's investments,
as well as limiting (for better or worse) his ability to actively
trade the fund's holdings. As a result, funds that were once actively
managed gradually come to resemble market index funds, without disclosing
it, and without the benefit of low cost that indexing provides. The
"closet index fund" is now a staple of the industry. While such a
fund looks like a duck, however, and walks like a duck, and quacks
like a duck, it denies being a duck.
But "duckness" can be measured. A correlation statistic
known as R-squared measures the portion of a fund's return that can
be explained by the return of the Standard & Poor's® 500 Index.
The average equity fund has a correlation of 83, meaning essentially
that 83% of the average fund's return can be Index-explained. But
18 of the 30 largest blend funds investing in large-cap stocks have
correlations of 94 or above, very close to the 100 correlation of
an S&P 500 Index Fund. If these funds are not closet index funds,
they are something terribly close. It behooves you to know the correlation
figures for the funds you own or are considering owning, and to decide
whether the implicit limitations on extra return are too great to
justify the costs involved. But I fear that in most closet index funds,
you are unlikely to find either a
perfect plan or a good plan.
|
Closet Index
Funds? Correlation of Major Large-Cap Blend Funds to the S&P
500 Index |
| Fund |
R-Squared |
Fund |
R-Squared |
Fund |
R-Squared |
| 1. |
94* |
11. |
92 |
21. |
94* |
| 2. |
97* |
12. |
96* |
22. |
98* |
| 3. |
83 |
13. |
97* |
23. |
91 |
| 4. |
81 |
14. |
88 |
24. |
91 |
| 5. |
94* |
15. |
94* |
25. |
81 |
| 6. |
96* |
16. |
84 |
26. |
96* |
| 7. |
88 |
17. |
95* |
27. |
96* |
| 8. |
96* |
18. |
90 |
28. |
83 |
| 9. |
86 |
19. |
97* |
29. |
95* |
| 10. |
95* |
20. |
95* |
30. |
94* |
| Average
of Top 30: 92 |
| Average
of All Funds: 83 |
Source: Morningstar, Inc.
Rule 9. Don't Own Too
Many FundsAnd Don't Trade Them
Let me ask your indulgence as I set forth one
final rule: Limit the number of funds you own, and don't trade them.
To paraphrase the old adage, "Too many funds spoil the perfect plan."
Why should this be so? First, the more funds you own, the greater
the chance that a truly inspired fund selection will have its success
spoiled by another fund that falls on its face. The problem has been
called "diworsesification," for it leads investors to build a portfolio
of funds containing so many individual stocks that it becomes itself
a closet index fund, again bereft of the index fund's positive attributes
of exceedingly low cost, minimal portfolio turnover, high tax-efficiency,
and clarity of investment objective. To me, that is far too much good
to relinquish in the search for the perfect.
Recent studies have shown that the average mutual
fund investor owns five mutual funds, and one of every ten investors
own eleven funds or more. Such a blunderbuss approach to fund ownership
is apt to be counterproductive. Even more counterproductive is the
active trading of mutual funds. Typically, an investor today holds
funds for but three years, an absurdly inadequate time frame for appraising
the results of an investment program that should be inherently long
term by nature. What is worse is that the funds may have been ill-selected
in the first instancefunds with inflated performance, funds
investing in hot market sectors, funds advertised on television, funds
that trade actively and relinquish much of their profit to taxes,
funds with high costs that didn't seem to matter when their past records
looked so good. But the worst aspect of trading funds is that it allows
the counterproductive emotions of investing to supersede the
productive economics of investing. The dream of a perfect plan
will never come true if mutual fund shares are traded as if
they were stocks.
The Perfect Plan or the Good Plan?
I believe that my nine rules for selecting
actively managed funds should afford you considerable advantage in
your quest for the perfect plan. Essentially, the idea is to buy right
and hold tight. The problem is that only a fairly small number of
funds will filter through my nine screens. There ought to be lots
more. This industry needs to get its house in order. So demand that
funds measure up to your standards. If you make your own investment
decisions with common sense and intelligence, the industry will be
forced to change and serve shareholders more efficiently and effectively,
reducing costs, risks, turnover, and hyperbole alike. Finally, youthe
fund shareholders, the owners of the fundmust be served. You
deserve a fair shake, and I'll keep speaking out until you get it.
Until that great change comes, however, you can't afford to ignore
the good plan. Index funds work well. The problem is that most actively
managed fundsburdened by excessive costs, promoted based on
outlandish claims of performance success, and managed with strategies
that call for a short-term focusdon't work very well.
Almost alone, the index fund follows a strategy designed to protect
your capital from the many croupiers who haunt the stock market casino.
It is for that reason that the index fund has proved to be the optimal
way "to realize the highest possible portionalbeit slightly
less than 100%of the return earned in the market."
It is a curious
irony that many fund managers who once knocked indexing (and many
who still do) now offer index funds. There are now some 380
index funds from which to choose, though precious few of them offer
durably low costs. Yet even as these active managers have finally
gotten around to offering investors the good plan of indexing, they
have also become latter-day stockbrokers, vigorously promoting active
trading of individual stocks over the Internet, encouraging investors
to dream of what is offered as an even more perfect plan. But
that plan, I fear, will become a nightmare.
A recent column by Charles A. Jaffe in your Boston
Globe got the issue just right. Comparing marriage and mutual
funds, he wrote, "the ideal mutual fund is one we can have and hold,
in sickness and health, in good times and bad, for as long as we live."
He urged investors not to have flings with hot funds nor to be seduced
by the lust for exceptional returns, but to have a long-term relationship
with funds with character, stability, and consistent long-term performance,
a relationship he characterized as "true love." Those sensible words
surely echo my keynote message today, as I close by reminding you
once more that "the greatest enemy of a good plan is the dream of
a perfect plan."
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can download a prospectus or request one by mail in the Prospectuses
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at 1-800-871-3879.
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